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Institutionalized Disruption: 
The Rise of the Reformer Startup 
 
Abraham J.B. Cable 
 
The following essay emerges from a joint symposium of the 
Hastings Business Law Journal and the Hastings Science and 
Technology Law Journal entitled “Regulating the Disruption 
Economy: Tech Startups as Regulatory Reformers.”  The symposium 
was held on March 20, 2015, and featured panels on virtual currency, 
crowdfunding, and the sharing economy. 
Drawing from the symposium, this essay considers why startups 
are increasingly taking up the mantle of regulatory reform, how they 
are achieving their successes, and whether the reformer startup is a 
positive development for our political economy.  It tentatively 
proposes that: (1) features of the current venture-capital market and 
startup ecosystem, rather than the pace of technological 
advancement, might explain the timing, (2) a “bootleggers and 
Baptists” dynamic of well-resourced interest groups and popular 
messaging explains the successes, and (3) we should be cautiously 




There is nothing new about startups operating in regulated fields.  
For instance, a significant percentage of venture-capital dollars have 
always been invested in biotech, where FDA approval looms large.1  
There is also nothing new about innovative technologies requiring 
new regulatory frameworks.  Widespread use of social media, for 
 
 Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  This essay 
benefited from helpful comments from John Crawford, Reza Dibadj, and Jodi Short.   
 1. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 2015 NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N Y.B. (18 ed. 
2015) [hereinafter NVCA YEARBOOK]. 
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example, eventually necessitated enhanced protection of privacy and 
data security.2  The recent symposium, however, reveals a different 
trend: startups premised on regulatory reform or acquiescence 
because they operate in the face or shadow of prohibitive regulatory 
regimes (“reformer startups”).3  Examples include sharing-economy 
companies (taxi and hotel licensing),4 crowdfunding platforms 
(private-offering regulation),5 and Bitcoin startups (financial 
regulation).6  In each case, startups obtained significant funding or 
built large customer bases without resolution of regulatory 
uncertainty.7   
 
 2. For an overview of the burgeoning field of privacy regulation, see DAVID J. SOLOVE & 
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS (3d ed. 2015). 
 3. It is, of course, difficult to ascertain how apparent the need for regulatory reform was at 
the time of founding.  One view is that the regulatory uncertainties revealed themselves only 
after the companies attracted attention.  See Jeffrey Rabkin, Special Assistant Attorney 
General, Office of the Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, Keynote Address at Hastings 
Business Law Journal and Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal Symposium: 
Regulating the Disruption Economy (Mar. 20, 2015)  (suggesting that regulatory issues are often 
the result of honest mistakes by entrepreneurs).   Another view is that entrepreneurs have a 
more intentional mindset of asking for forgiveness rather than permission.  See Lucas E. 
Buckley, Jesse K. Fishman & Matthew K. Kauffman, The Intersection of Innovation and the 
Law, WYO. LAW., Aug. 2015, at 38 (noting that “[m]any innovative companies are using 
technology to invade highly-regulated industries”); see also Shredding the Rules, ECONOMIST 
(May 2, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/business/21650142-striking-number-innovative-
companies-have-business-models-flout-law-shredding [hereinafter Shredding the Rules] (“A 
striking number of innovative companies have business models that flout the law.”); Rabkin, 
supra note 3 (suggesting that entrepreneurs are not the type to “read the back of the Scrabble 
box”).  In any event, one can assume that these companies, often represented by elite national 
law firms and vetted thoroughly by venture-capital investors, began thinking about their 
regulatory status sooner rather than later. 
 4. See Sara Thornton, The Transportation Monopoly Game: Why Taxicabs Are Losing 
and Why Texas Should Let Transportation Network Company Tokens Play, 47 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 893, 901–04 (2015) (describing the origins of taxi regulations and their effects on ride-
sharing companies); see also Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in 
Occupancy Regulation and Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 108–09 (2015) 
(discussing regulation of hotels in New York and potential effects on Airbnb’s business 
operations). 
 5. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 49–80 (2012) (discussing the status of crowdfunding under the federal securities 
laws). 
 6. See Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in 
the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 300–13 (2015) (discussing the possible application of 
state and federal money-transmitting laws and other regulations to virtual currency). 
 7. For a description of Bitcoin’s successes, see Tu & Meredith, supra note 6, at 285 (noting 
that over three hundred thousand dollars in Bitcoin transactions are processed per day).  See 
also Yuliya Chernova, Big Day for Bitcoin Startups: Three Startups Haul in $23.5M in Funding, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2014, 5:10 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/03/26/big-day-
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Viewed this way, it is the regulatory successes rather than 
failures of these companies that most warrants our attention.  While 
reformer startups hit some bumps in the road,8 they mostly 
maneuvered their way to regulatory truces that opened enough room 
for growth.  For example, financial regulators have signaled a hands-
off approach to many aspects of Bitcoin.9  Uber and Lyft operate 
under modified regulatory frameworks tailored to “transportation 
network companies.”10  San Francisco just enacted the nation's first 
 
for-bitcoin-startups-three-startups-haul-in-23-5m-in-funding/.  For a discussion of Airbnb’s 
successes, see Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 4, at 104 (“Over the course of its brief existence, 
Airbnb has experienced exponential growth.  Today it hosts more than one million listings in 
over one hundred and ninety countries and territories around the world.”).  For a discussion of 
Uber and Lyft’s growth, see Stephanie Francis Ward, Internet Car Companies Offer 
Convenience, But Lawyers See Caution Signs, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/internet_car_companies_offer_convenience_but_la
wyers_see_caution_signs (indicating that Uber raised two hundred fifty-eight million dollars in a 
one-year period, and that Lyft had raised eighty-two million dollars).  Crowdfunding is 
surprisingly prevalent given the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) reluctance to 
implement definitive regulation as directed by Congress.  See Scott Andersen, Sr., Equity & 
Debt Crowdfunding—Where We Are Now and What’s Next, CROWDFUND BEAT, 
http://crowdfundbeat.com/2015/05/13/equity-debt-crowdfunding-platforms-where-we-are-now-
and-whats-next/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (suggesting that billions of dollars are being raised 
through internet solicitations under Rule 506(c) of Regulation D and SEC no-action letters 
granted to funding platforms FundersClub and AngelList); see also Alex Feldman, 230 VCs, 
and Angels Invest in Crowdfunding Platforms, CROWDSUNITE (Dec. 6, 2013), http://crowds 
unite.com/blog/230-vcs-and-angels-invest-in-crowdfunding-platforms/ (reporting that angel and 
venture-capital investors have invested eight hundred million dollars in crowdfunding 
platforms). 
 8. E.g., Boris Bindman, Keep on Truckin’, Uber: Using the Dormant Commerce Clause to 
Challenge Regulatory Roadblocks to TNCs, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 136, 142 (2015) 
(discussing regulatory actions against ridesharing companies and their drivers). 
 9. Specifically, federal regulators have indicated that Bitcoin exchanges, but not Bitcoin 
miners or investors, may be money-transmitters subject to anti-money-laundering regulations. 
 Several states have determined that Bitcoin firms are not money-transmitters under their 
regulatory schemes, and California and New York have enacted legislation to accommodate 
Bitcoin under existing regulatory regimes.  See Tu & Meredith, supra note 6, at 304–13.  Tu and 
Meredith summarize the U.S. regulatory climate for Bitcoin as follows: “As a whole . . . the 
regulatory response in the United States can be described as generally open to the continued 
growth and use of virtual currency as a viable payment alternative so long as appropriate 
regulations can be implemented to address issues associated with increasingly mainstream 
virtual currency usages and business models.” 
 10. In California and several other jurisdictions, ride-sharing companies operate under a 
“transportation network company” license that is less demanding than traditional taxi licensing. 
See Ward, supra note 7 (noting adverse actions of regulators against ride-sharing companies, 
but also noting that “other municipalities are carefully backing the idea” of ride-sharing); 
Bindman, supra note 8, at 144 (“[Transportation network companies] are blowing through all of 
the yellow and red lights that have presented roadblocks to their operations.  After evading 
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“Airbnb law” to accommodate the company's popularity.11  Congress 
blessed crowdfunding and directed the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) to follow suit.12 
This essay examines the rise of the reformer startup by posing 
three questions: why now, why have these reform efforts succeeded, 
and is the reformer startup a positive development for our political 
economy?  In addressing those questions, I sketch out the following 
possible answers: (1) a frothy venture capital (“VC”) market and 
startup ecosystem explains the timing, (2) a combination of well-
resourced startups and popular affection for Silicon Valley startups 
explains the success, and (3) a cautious optimism is warranted 
because reform-minded startups may be a helpful counterpart to the 
market and political power of incumbents. 
 
II. WHY NOW?  UNICORNS AND MEGAFUNDS 
 
If reformer startups are a recent phenomenon, why are we seeing 
them now? 
One possible answer is that the pace of technological innovation 
is quickening, creating a growing need for reform.13  The symposium 
was shot through with references to a “knowledge gap” between tech-
savvy entrepreneurs and less sophisticated regulators.14  In light of 
 
classification and regulation under existing regimes, Uber and Lyft have themselves sought to 
exploit the logic of regulatory capture.”); see Thornton, supra note 4, at 911–28 (comparing 
traditional taxi regulations and regulation of transportation network companies by Texas 
municipalities). 
 11. See Dana Palumbo, Note, A Tale of Two Cities: The Regulatory Battle to Incorporate 
Short-Term Residential Rentals Into Modern Law, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 287, 309–18 (2015) 
(discussing San Francisco’s new law). 
 12. Congress created an exemption specifically for crowdfunding under the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act of 2012 (“JOBS Act”).  See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, How 
Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and 
Inexpert Judgments That Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865 (2014).  Although the SEC 
has failed to finalize implementing regulations for the crowdfunding exemption, crowdfunding 
platforms have begun operations, with some restrictions on their investor pools, under 
alternative provisions of the JOBS Act that loosen regulation of online solicitations more 
broadly.  See generally supra note 7. 
 13. See Rabkin, supra note 3 (suggesting we are at the “dawn of a new age” and citing 
Moore’s Law regarding computing power and Metcalf’s Law regarding network effects). 
 14. E.g., Candice Taylor, Assoc. Litigation Counsel, Lyft, Address at Hastings Business 
Law Journal and Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal Symposium: Regulating the 
Disruption Economy (Mar. 20, 2015). 
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such a gap, lobbying efforts can be seen as an educational exercise, 
and reformer startups are doing the tough sledding of getting 
regulation right in a fast-moving world.15 
But one might question the underlying premise of this view—
that we are in the midst of particularly transformative innovation.  
The products represented at the symposium are certainly popular,16 
and they might even represent an important change in social 
organization.17  But change is always afoot, and it is not self-evident 
that the current period of innovation stands out.18  There is even a 
view from prominent economists that today's technological advances 
are modest compared to previous periods, at least when measured by 
their effects on economic productivity.19  At the very least, measuring 
the pace of innovation seems a vexing task, and it is worth exploring 
whether there is something else distinctive about today’s startup 
ecosystem that could explain the rise of the reformer startup. 
The most conspicuous feature of today’s startups is their size.  By 
one recent count, there were over one hundred startups valued at 
over one billion dollars—so-called “unicorn companies.”20  These 
companies are startups in only a loose sense.  True, they have short 
operating histories and they have not had an initial public offering of 
 
 15. In this vein, several panel participants characterized interactions between entrepreneurs 
and regulators as efforts to “educate” or “help” the former.  E.g., Taylor, supra note 14 
(discussing efforts to help regulators understand the ride-sharing business). 
 16. See supra note 7 (discussing the successes of sharing-economy, crowdfunding, and 
Bitcoin startups in attracting customers). 
 17.  Katie Biber, Senior Counsel, Airbnb, Address at Hastings Business Law Journal and 
Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal Symposium: Regulating the Disruption 
Economy (Mar. 20, 2015) (describing AirBNB as having “real social power”). 
 18. For example, one could make the argument that changes in transportation technologies 
and industrial organization in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were particularly 
profound.  E.g. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, UNDAUNTED COURAGE: MERIWETHER LEWIS, 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, AND THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WEST 53–54 (1996) (observing 
that, prior to railroads, there had been very little innovation in transportation since ancient 
times). 
 19. See Growth: The Great Innovation Debate, ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2013), www.econ 
omist.com/news/leaders/21569393-fears-innovation-slowing-are-exaggerated-governments-need-
help-it-along-great (discussing the work of Robert Gordon).  Robert Gordon has colorfully 
suggested a “toilet test” for measuring the impact of innovation.  His point is that few 
innovations measure up. 
 20. Rolf Winkler & Telis Demos, Tech Firms Are Notably Scarce in IPO Market, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 10, 2005, 10:14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-parade-continues-without-many-
tech-companies-1441929152 (estimating the number of startups with valuations in excess of one 
billion dollars). 
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stock (“IPO”).  But they may have thousands of employees and may 
have obtained hundreds of millions (in some cases billions) in 
venture-capital and other forms of financing.21  These well-heeled 
startups have capacity to engage with regulators in ways that the 
archetypical startup—making do on a shoestring budget—might 
lack.22 
Another distinctive feature of the startup landscape is the size of 
today's venture-capital (“VC”) market.  According to the industry’s 
leading trade association, “[b]y any measure, 2014 was a remarkable 
year for the venture capital market in the United States.”23  The total 
amount invested by VC funds in startups is the highest since the dot-
com era.24  In addition, the amount that endowments, pension funds, 
and other institutional investors invest with VC managers has been on 
the upswing.25  In particular, top-tier VC managers are having unusual 
success in raising capital.26 
It is plausible that a VC manager will put money to work more 
creatively in this market.  Historically, VC managers might have shied 
away from an investment premised on regulatory reform in order to 
focus on the types of technological and operational challenges that 
 
 21. Winkler & Demos, supra note 20. (noting that Uber has raised over five billion dollars 
in financing and is valued at over fifty billion dollars). 
 22. The mere fact that Symposium panelists featured titles like “Manager of Government 
Relations” suggests the garage is far in the rearview mirror for these startups.  See Mike Isaac, 
Uber Picks David Plouffe to Wage Regulatory Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/technology/uber-picks-a-political-insider-to-wage-its-regulat 
ory-battles.html?_r=0 (reporting that Uber hired David Plouffe, former campaign manager for 
President Obama); see also Mike Isaac, Airbnb Hires Chris Lehane, Former Aide to Bill 
Clinton, as Head of Policy, N.Y. TIMES: BITS BLOG (Aug. 27, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/airbnb-appoints-chris-lehane-former-adviser-to-bill-clin 
ton-as-head-of-policy/ (reporting that Airbnb hired a former adviser to Bill Clinton). 
 23. NVCA YEARBOOK, supra note 1, at 9. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. According to National Venture Capital Fund statistics, thirty-one venture-capital 
managers manage over one billion dollars.  Id. at 17–19.  Average fund size is greater than the 
industry’s heyday in the early 2000s.  Id. at 9.  Though average fund size has actually come down 
in recent years, see id. at 20, that may be because the industry is bifurcating into very large funds 
and smaller seed funds.  Id. at 17 (noting that “the bulk of the capital (measured by dollars) 
being committed today is being raised by larger, specialty, and boutique firms.”).  In short, top-
tier venture capital firms are capturing an increasing percentage of available capital.  See Mark 
Suster, The Changing Structure of the VC Industry, FORTUNE (July 22, 2014, 9:15 AM), 
http://fortune.com/ 2014/07/22/the-changing-structure-of-the-vc-industry. 
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are better suited for the typical VC manger's skill set.27  But in a 
headier environment, where venture capitalists face tough 
competition for the most attractive traditional deals, funds might be 
more willing to leave their comfort zone.28 
If a distinctive startup ecosystem—featuring atypically mature 
startups and a particularly flush VC industry—help explain the 
reformer startup, one might ask whether the trend is just a temporary 
disequilibrium.  Perhaps macroeconomic developments and hard 
lessons will swing the pendulum, and the reformer startup will be no 
more than a historical footnote. 
I suspect, however, that such a trend could have staying power.  
Even an investment model that is as path dependent as venture 
capital can sometimes find a new path.29  If today's reformer startups 
succeed, it may clear the way for others to follow suit. 
In the end, this explanation for the rise of the reformer startup is 
admittedly conjecture.  But it is important to look hard for 
alternatives to claims of technological exceptionalism.  As described 
in Part III below, we exhibit a collective enthusiasm for technological 
innovation.  But if we reflexively believe there is a widening 
knowledge gap, we risk relying on the wrong policy prescriptions. 
 
III. WHY SUCCESS?  “BOOTLEGGERS AND BAPTISTS” 
 
A separate question is how reformer startups are achieving their 
successes.  As a preliminary matter, it is useful to consider why these 
successes might be surprising. 
Companies featured at the symposium are all acting as a sort of 
intermediary, connecting drivers and passengers, property owners 
and travelers, payors and payees, and investors and issuers.  In each 
 
 27. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law, 66 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (describing the skill set of the typical VC manager). 
 28. Christina Farr, Venture Capitalists Face a More Competitive, Global Market, 
VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 13, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/03/13/venture-capital 
ists-face-a-more-competitive-global-market (suggesting that increased competition among VC 
managers means “[t]hey have become more global in their geographic outlook, more 
sophisticated in their analysis of opportunities and more innovative in terms of how, where and 
when to invest.”). 
 29. See Suster, supra note 26 (suggesting that the bifurcation of the VC industry into large 
and small funds is an important “structural shift” in venture-capital investing). 
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case, incumbents provide similar intermediation (e.g., traditional 
banks or money transmitters offer services that compete with Bitcoin 
startups) or benefit from the absence of such intermediaries (e.g., 
traditional hotel groups benefit if property owners are not easily 
matched with travelers). 
Public-interest theory predicts that these incumbents will fight 
hard to preserve the current regulatory environment as a barrier to 
entry.30  In some cases, the incumbents are formidable.  Financial-
institution and hospitality-industry giants may have considerable 
resources to expend on preserving the status quo.31  In other 
instances, the balance of power may be different.  We can assume that 
Uber has a considerable war chest compared to local taxi owners.32  
But even in these instances, incumbents have a tremendous amount 
at stake and may have long patterns of interactions with regulators—
“capture” in the language of public interest theory.33  And regulatory 
flip-flops may have a high political cost to the regulator or lawmaker 
if the current regime plausibly produces public benefit. In the end, 
regulations tend to be “durable,” even if not impenetrable, barriers to 
competition.34 
How, then, are reformer startups making so much headway?  
Public-choice theory again offers some insight. 
Public-choice theorists observe that the most ambitious efforts to 
influence law require a combination of economically minded interest 
groups and publicly minded rhetoric capable of achieving broader 
support.  Bruce Yandle, for example, famously attributed Sunday 
 
 30. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 67 (2009).  One can adopt this view while being agnostic on the 
underlying merits of the regulatory regimes.  Taxi and hotel licensing, securities regulation, and 
money-transmitting laws might have been enacted, and still operate, as public-regarding laws. 
 Or they might be the result of self-interested rent seeking.  For this essay's purposes, the point 
is that they become valuable to incumbents as they structure their businesses around the 
existing regime.  See id. (discussing the concept of “rent extraction”). 
 31. See Kaplan & Nadler, supra note 4, at 107 (“Airbnb hosts face strong headwinds from a 
well-funded coalition of landlords and hotel-industry leaders, which plans to spend millions of 
dollars on a public campaign criticizing Airbnb.”). 
 32. See Rabkin, supra note 3 (answering questions regarding possible unfairness to taxi cab 
owners). 
 33. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569, 578–83 
(2012) (summarizing, and then critiquing, a conventional view of regulatory capture). 
 34. STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 30, at 49 (describing rents from protectionist 
regulatory policies as being more “durable” than market-driven monopolistic pricing). 
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closing laws to a coalition of “bootleggers and Baptists.”35  
Bootleggers had a strong economic interest in eliminating legal 
competition and the temperance movement gave the cause a moral 
charge that made it politically palatable.36 
In the case of reformer startups, the narrow economic interests 
are easy enough to identify.  The companies’ investors, founders, and 
employees (presumably compensated by stock options) have plenty 
to gain. 
The Baptists are harder to pin down.  Make no mistake, reformer 
startups have their evangelists.  Proponents of Uber and Lyft literally 
take to the street in support of ride-sharing.37  “Tech missionaries” 
lobby on behalf of virtual currency.38  The “crowdfunding exemption 
movement” has a meticulously maintained Wikipedia page (not to 
mention an unpredicted celebrity endorsement by Whoopi 
Goldberg!).39  These are more fervent demonstrations of support than 
one might expect in connection with taxi regulation, payment 
systems, and private-offering regulation.  But clearly, these 
technologies strike a chord—libertarian, egalitarian, or otherwise—
with some subset of the population. 
But what about the rest of us?  Are we convinced of the 
transformative nature of these companies and their products?  Does 
 
 35. See id. at 75, Yandle summarizes his theory as follows: “Durable social regulation 
evolves when it is demanded by both of two distinctly different groups. ‘Baptists’ point to the 
moral high ground and give vital and vocal endorsement of laudable public benefits promised by 
a desired regulation.  Baptists flourish when their moral message forms a visible foundation for 
political action.  ‘Bootleggers’ are much less visible but no less vital.  Bootleggers, who expect to 
profit from the very regulatory restrictions desired by Baptists, grease the political machinery 
with some of their expected proceeds.  They are simply in it for the money.” Bruce Yandle, 
Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, 22 REGULATION 3 (1999).   
 36. Yandle’s theory emphasizes the importance of rhetoric in lowering the political cost of 
granting interest group concessions.  See id. at 7 (“[R]hetoric matters a lot in the world of 
politics but . . . neither well-varnished moral prompting nor unvarnished campaign contributions 
can do the job alone.  It takes both.”). 
 37. Christina Farr, Uber & Lyft Have a Secret Weapon in the Fight for Regulatory 
Approval: You, VENTUREBEAT (Sept. 11, 2013, 10:15 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2013/09/11/ 
ridesharing/ (describing grassroots appeal of ride-sharing companies and their reform efforts, 
and indicating that such broad-based support has influenced venture-capital investment 
decisions). 
 38. See Chris Moody, Meet the People Trying to Make Bitcoin Work in Washington, 
Yahoo! News (June 2, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/bitcoin-lobbyists-212631321. 
html. 
 39. See Crowdfunding Exemption Movement, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Crowdfunding_exemption_movement (last visited Oct. 26, 2015). 
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the rhetoric of the technology evangelists provide sufficient cover for 
politicians and regulators to remake long-standing legal regimes in 
the image of a relatively small number of well-funded startups? 
Consider two possibilities.  One view is that the rhetoric doesn’t 
matter much, and what matters is straightforward consumer welfare 
(or perception thereof).  These companies managed to scale rapidly 
in legal grey areas, and they delivered products at lower costs or with 
improved service.  Inexpensive transportation, lodging, and money 
transmission are relatively salient benefits—felt more immediately by 
voters than the projected benefits of lifting a steel tariff, for 
example—and so they might obviate the need for the loftier 
messaging that Yandle and company envision.40 
I would not be so quick to dismiss the social meaning of reformer 
startups, however.  We may not share the evangelists' more grandiose 
visions—for example, that the right software code compels a 
fundamental rethinking of the state.41  But reformer startups do seem 
to resonate with more broadly held views. 
First, we often see technological innovation as the way forward 
in difficult times.  For example, the "knowledge-based economy” is 
held out as a remedy for the dislocation caused by global economic 
trends.42  Even those with no intent to share a ride, spend a Bitcoin, or 
host a stranger may believe that our collective prosperity increasingly 
 
 40. Again, one need not reach a conclusion about the underlying merits of the current 
regulatory regimes to adopt this view.  The highly salient benefits provided by reformer startups 
may or may not be outweighed by health, safety, and security concerns.  But those costs, even if 
significant, are arguably murkier, or more contingent, than the immediate price and service 
benefits and might therefore be difficult for consumers to internalize. 
 41. Alan Feuer, The Bitcoin Ideology, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/12/15/sunday-review/the-bitcoin-ideology.html (describing Bitcoin as a philosophy and 
movement with anarchic and libertarian roots, which has as its goals “to unleash repressed 
economies, to take down global banking or to wage a war against the Federal Reserve”); see 
also About, SHAREABLE, http://www.shareable.net/about (last visited Oct 26. 2015) (“The 
sharing transformation shows that it’s possible to govern ourselves, build a green economy that 
serves everyone, and create meaningful lives together.”). 
 42. Abraham J.B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow’s Economy, Yesterday’s Start-Ups, 2 
MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 195, 212–13 (2013) (discussing the effects that 
reduced transportation and communication costs have had on traditional manufacturing and 
natural-resource-extraction industries, and the perception that economic regions in the U.S. 
must be reoriented to participate in the “knowledge-based economy”) (citing EDWARD 
GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 49 (2011); RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE 
CLASS AND HOW ITS TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 44 
(2002)). 
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depends on inventing, rather than making, things. 
In addition, we have a distinctive affinity for the entrepreneurs 
who turn these innovative ideas into businesses.43  Entrepreneurship 
takes place everywhere,44 but one senses that it is especially valued in 
the United States.45  The origins of this sentiment are beyond the 
scope of this essay, but candidates include long-held commitments to 
upward mobility and decentralized power. 
As the embodiment of both technological innovation and 
entrepreneurship,46 Silicon Valley seems to have attained privileged 
status in our political economy.47  Tax policy, securities regulation, 
and a dizzying array of public programs seek to spread and replicate 
its distinctive system for incubating new businesses.48  Its appeal 
extends far beyond economic-development wonks.  Silicon Valley's 
distinctive lexicon permeates television and movies.49  We mourned 
the passing of Steve Jobs like a beloved public figure.  In short, our 
heroes seem to wear hoodies these days. 
 
 43. The concepts of entrepreneurship and technological innovation overlap but are not 
coterminous.  Gordon Smith and Darian Ibrahim cite Joseph Schumpeter in identifying an 
“entrepreneurial opportunity” as any one of: new goods, new methods of production, new 
geographical markets, new raw materials, and new ways of organizing.  D. Gordon Smith & 
Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1540–
41 (2013). 
 44. E.g., id. at 1533–34 (recounting one entrepreneur’s tale of starting a business in remote 
Siberia). 
 45. This point is implied by an anecdote in Smith and Ibrahim’s ambitious piece arguing 
that entrepreneurship is an animating value in U.S. law.  They describe a German colleague who 
holds entrepreneurship in low regard.  See id. at 1550.  Similarly, scholars have argued that 
efforts to replicate the U.S. venture-capital market in other societies have failed because of less 
favorable cultural attitudes towards entrepreneurship.  Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture 
Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1102–03 (2003) 
(discussing, with some skepticism, the extent to which cultural differences might affect efforts to 
“engineer” a venture-capital market). 
 46. In previous work, I have argued that policy makers are sometimes too quick to conflate 
entrepreneurship and Silicon Valley-style venture capital.  See Cable, supra note 42, at 198 
(citing PAUL KEDROSKY, RIGHT-SIZING THE U.S. VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY 1 (2009), 
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/usventcap061009r1.pdf). 
 47. I borrow the term “privileged status” from my colleague Jodi Short, who noted that 
participants in one panel were ascribing such status to the term “innovation.” 
 48. Cable, supra note 42, at 197–98 (explaining a variety of public programs supporting 
Silicon Valley-style entrepreneurship); see generally JOSH LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN 
DREAMS: WHY PUBLIC EFFORTS TO BOOST ENTREPRENEURSHIP HAVE FAILED—AND WHAT 
TO DO ABOUT IT (2009) (describing efforts in the U.S. and globally to emulate Silicon Valley). 
 49. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Startup Lawyers at the Outskirts, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
163, 178 (2015) (discussing the social impact of Silicon Valley). 
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And here is where the reformer startup may go off script a bit.  
In Yandle's formulation, the bootleggers must work behind the 
scenes and rely on the Baptists to be the public face of the movement.  
Reformer startups, however, can plausibly occupy the pulpit 
themselves.  As a society, we are inclined to see some broader 
significance in their economic successes.  With potentially deep 
pockets and a shiny public image, reformer startups are potential 
lobbying juggernauts. 
 
IV. A CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM 
 
So far, this essay suggests that market conditions in Silicon 
Valley explain the rise of the reformer startup, and that a 
“bootleggers and Baptists” dynamic explains reformer startups’ 
successes.  If true, what to make of it all? 
There is a cynical view that we are witnessing nothing more than 
old-fashioned rent-seeking with only a veneer of broader importance.  
By this view, neither the incumbents nor the current crop of startups 
can be trusted to pursue anything but self-interest, and the regulatory 
environment is available to the highest bidder (net of political costs). 
At the other extreme, reformer startups represent the public 
interest.  The success of their products exposes current regulation as 
wrongheaded.  Reformer startups and their grassroots advocates 
educate, or expose, regulators and lawmakers who would otherwise 
be hopelessly anachronistic or beholden to incumbents. 
Perhaps we can draw something from each view.  We should be 
careful about treating innovation and entrepreneurship as trump 
cards in policy debate.  In the current environment, it can be hard to 
tell who is the David and who is the Goliath.  Each regulatory battle 
has its own political economy, and we cannot assume that the benefits 
of innovation necessarily outweigh traditional health, safety, and 
investor protections. 
On the other hand, I am cautiously optimistic about the big 
picture.  Silicon Valley's distinctive systems of finance, labor, and 
industrial organization are the envy of the world.50  Together, they 
form an important institution—the startup ecosystem—that enables 
 
 50. See LERNER, supra note 48 (discussing efforts to import the Silicon Valley model). 
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long-shot efforts to unseat incumbents.  This “institutionalized 
disruption” could be an important counter to the inertia of 
anticompetitive regulation.  In the long run, I hope we might see 
more thoughtful regulation if well-financed and politically palatable 
startups regularly take aim at the status quo.  Only time will tell. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
